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Ausubel's dynamic private-values auction for heterogeneous dis-
crete goods, Ausubel (2006), yields an ecient equilibrium outcome
but it is designed for a limited class of environments. If bidders' values
for bundles of goods are not integers, then the auction mechanism may
not yield an ecient allocation without any information on bidders'
values. In this paper, I extend Ausubel's auction for heterogeneous
discrete goods to real-valued quasilinear utility functions. The mech-
anism I propose reaches a Walrasian equilibrium price vector in nite
\steps" without any additional information on bidders' values. In the
extension of Ausubel's auction, truthful bidding constitutes an e-
cient equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Auctioning of multiple goods has become a rapidly developing part of the
auction theory since the Federal Communications Commission began auc-
tioning wireless communication bands in 1994. It is well-known that when
many units of a good are to be auctioned, standard auction mechanisms are
generally inecient, i.e., they do not award goods to buyers who value them
most. This ineciency arises from buyers' tendency to shade their bids,
the demand-reduction problem (see Krishna (2002), Ausubel and Cramton
(2002), and Milgrom (2004)). Vickrey's sealed-bid auction, Vickrey (1961),
is among the few exceptions immune to the demand-reduction problem. Even
though the Vickrey auction is ecient, it is not widely used in practice. In
the Vickrey auction, bidders are supposed to submit their whole demand
curves to the auctioneer. So, if there are 10 objects for sale, each bidder
must compute and submit his values for 210 bundles of goods. Bidders pre-
fer not to submit so much information about themselves. Ausubel (2006)
introduced an elegant dynamic auction for divisible and discrete heteroge-
neous goods, and it is immune to the demand-reduction problem. However,
Ausubel's auction for heterogeneous discrete goods is designed for a lim-
ited class of environments: Bidders' values for bundles are restricted to be
integers, and the t^ atonnement algorithm (price adjustment procedure, see
Ausubel (2005)) uses integer property of utility functions. If bidders' val-
ues for bundles are not integers, without information on these values, the
t^ atonnement algorithm may not reach a Walrasian equilibrium price vector.
The reason for this integer restriction is not explained in his paper.
One may argue that Ausubel's auction, which uses the grid of integer
prices, with suciently ne grid of prices is a straightforward approxima-
tion of Ausubel's auction to real numbers resulting in prices close to equi-
librium prices. The rst problem with this argument is that the integer
assumption has a signicant role in the price adjustment procedure: during
the ascending price adjustment procedure, if bidders have substitutes pref-
erences and they sincerely report their demand sets, at each integer price
vector reached, the auctioneer determines bidders' indirect utility functions
2correctly for all prices in the K-dimensional unit cube above that integer
price vector (See Ausubel (2005), p.619). Using these correct indirect util-
ity functions, the auctioneer computes the next integer price vector in the
price adjustment. If the integer assumption is relaxed, the auctioneer may
not be able to correctly determine the indirect utility functions in the K-
dimensional cube above some price vector no matter how small the size of
the grid. As a result, the price adjustment procedure may not follow the
price path it is designed to because the auctioneer does not have the correct
information about indirect utility functions. The second problem is about
the allocation of goods: Ausubel's auction is designed to allocate goods if
and only if an equilibrium price is reached, and the corresponding market
clearing allocation is used. There is no straightforward way to choose an al-
location if the procedure stops at a non-equilibrium price vector. Moreover,
it is not possible to get arbitrarily close to an ecient allocation by making
the grid ner because goods are discrete.
In this paper, I extend Ausubel's auction for heterogeneous discrete goods
to real-valued quasilinear utility functions by introducing an analogous ex-
tension of the t^ atonnement algorithm in Ausubel (2006). I show that the
extended t^ atonnement algorithm reaches a Walrasian equilibrium price vec-
tor in nite \steps" when bidders' values are real numbers. The extended
Ausubel auction for heterogeneous discrete goods has an ecient equilibrium
and yields Walrasian equilibrium prices when bidders' values for bundles are
real numbers. Unlike the t^ atonnement algorithm of Ausubel (2006), in the
extended t^ atonnement algorithm, the auctioneer does not need any informa-
tion on the values bidders' utility functions take when these values are not
integers.
In Ausubel's auction, Ausubel (2006), bidders submit their demands as
prices are adjusted. A bidder is credited a unit of a good at the current
price when the rest of the bidders lower their demand for this good. A unit
of a good is debited from a bidder at the current price when the rest of
the bidders increase their demand for this good. The auctioneer calculates
the set of goods in excess demand and adjusts the prices accordingly. The
auction ends whenever there is a market clearing allocation demanded by
bidders at the current price. Bidders are assumed to have private values
for goods (each bidder's values for goods depend only on his own type) and
have utility functions quasilinear in money. In the case of divisible goods,
bidders have concave utility functions whereas in the case of discrete goods,
they have preferences satisfying the gross substitutes condition. The gross
3substitutes assumption basically requires that a bidder's demand for a set
of goods to be nondecreasing if their prices remain the same while the rest
of the prices do not decrease. This assumption guarantees the existence
of a Walrasian equilibrium (see Gul and Stacchetti (1999)). When goods
are divisible, the classical Walrasian t^ atonnement is used to determine the
path of prices. In the case of discrete goods, a t^ atonnement algorithm (see
Ausubel (2005)) is used. There are two analogous versions of the t^ atonnement
algorithm: the ascending algorithm and the descending algorithm. Ausubel
(2005) shows that the ascending (descending) algorithm reaches a Walrasian
equilibrium price vector in nite steps if the initial prices are suciently
small (large). Ausubel (2006) converts this discrete-time price adjustment
procedure to a continuous-time price adjustment procedure. He achieves that
by linearly increasing (or decreasing) prices between two consecutive integer-
valued price vectors determined by the t^ atonnement algorithm. Then, he
uses this continuous-time price adjustment procedure to prove that sincere
bidding by bidders comprise an ecient equilibrium and yields Walrasian
equilibrium prices.
As Ausubel's auction does not require bidders to reveal all of their de-
mands at all prices, it preserves privacy of bidders, and it is simpler than the
Vickrey auction. Also, bidders are allowed to exercise their market power
but strategic bidders behave as price-takers under Ausubel's nonlinear pric-
ing rule, which solves the demand-reduction problem.
In the proposed extension of Ausubel's auction for discrete heterogeneous
goods, the auction starts at an initial price vector p(0). Each bidder submits
his report, a set of bundle of goods he demands at p(0). Bidders are allowed
to respond to each other's reports at the same price p(0). Rounds of these
bidders' reports continue as long as there is a bidder who wants to report
a demand set. After these rounds are over, the auctioneer adjusts prices
continuously according to the extended t^ atonnement algorithm using the
demand reports from the last round. Bidders may add a new bundle to or
remove a bundle from their demand set during the price adjustment. They
submit their reports whenever they add a new bundle to their demand sets
as prices change. At any time t 2 [0;1), if there is a bidder who submits a
new report at the current price p(t), then the price adjustment stops. Again,
bidders are allowed to respond to these reports. After rounds of bidding are
over, prices are adjusted continuously according to the extended t^ atonnement
algorithm using the demand reports from the last round. During the price
adjustment process, for each bidder i 2 N, if opponents of bidder i lower
4their demand for a good, then the good is credited to bidder i at price p(t).
On the other hand, if opponents of bidder i rise their demand for a good, then
it is debited from bidder i at price p(t). The auction ends at time T 2 [0;1)
when there is a market clearing allocation of goods in these reports made
at time T. Payment of each bidder is calculated by adding his credits and
debits, and market clearing allocation of goods are made.
Milgrom and Strulovici (2009) in a recent paper also extended the Ausubel
auction independently. They use a steepest-descent algorithm whereas the
algorithm used in this paper is an analogous extension of the t^ atonnement al-
gorithm of Ausubel (2006). In the extended algorithm proposed here, unlike
Milgrom and Strulovici (2009), bidders do not reveal their demands continu-
ously. Bidders report their demand sets nitely many times, whenever they
add a new bundle to their demand sets during the price adjustment process.
Section 2 gives the assumptions of the model. In Section 3, the extension
of Ausubel's auction and the extended t^ atonnement algorithm are explained.
Section 4 explains how to identify paths of the extended ascending and de-
scending algorithms, and shows that they reach Walrasian equilibrium price
vectors in nite steps.
2 The Model
In this paper, I follow a notation very similar to the one in Ausubel (2005)
so that the reader can easily follow one paper after the other. Let Z, Q, and
R stand for the sets of integer, rational and real numbers respectively. There
are nite number of goods, K = f1;2;:::;Kg. There is a seller with supply
S = (Sk)k2K 2 ZK
++ of discrete heterogeneous goods, and she wants to sell
them to a nite group of bidders, N = f1;2;:::;Ng. Consumption set of
bidder i is Xi = fx 2 ZK : 0  xk  xk
i for all k 2 Kg where (xk
i)k2K 2 ZK,
and it is bounded below and above. xi = (xk
i)k2K 2 Xi is a bundle bidder i
consumes.
The following assumptions are made for each bidder i:
A:1 Private Values: Bidder i's utility function ui : Xi  R ! R is a
function of bundle xi 2 Xi and money ti 2 R he consumes, and it does not
depend on any information about other bidders.
A:2 Quasilinearity: ui() is assumed to be quasilinear in money, i.e., there
exists Ui : Xi ! R such that for each xi 2 Xi and each ti 2 R,
5ui(xi;ti) = Ui(xi) + ti
where Ui(xi) is i's value for bundle xi.
Initial wealth mi 2 R++ of each bidder i 2 N is so large that his budget
constraint does not bind for any bundle he demands at any price. Since
ui(xi;mi   yi) = Ui(xi) + mi   yi where yi is the amount of expense he
makes, mi will be dropped without loss of generality.
A:3 Strict Monotonicity: For all (x0
i;t0













fUi(xi)   p  xig;




fUi(xi)   p  xig:
A Walrasian equilibrium is (p;x) where p is equilibrium price vector
and x = (xi)i2N is equilibrium allocation, such that for each bidder i 2 N
x
i 2 Qi(p), and
P
i2N x
i = S. Existence of Walrasian equilibrium heavily
relies on the gross substitutes assumption. Gul and Stacchetti (1999) shows
that the gross substitutes assumption is sucient and \almost necessary" for
the existence of the Walrasian equilibrium. In the gross substitutes assump-
tion below, each good is assumed to be available in unit supply. The auction
mechanism proposed in this paper, like Ausubel's auction Ausubel (2006),
allows multiple units of each good without loss of generality (see Bikhchan-
dani and Mamer (1997)). For more on the gross substitutes assumption see
Milgrom and Strulovici (2009): they make an extensive analysis of the gross
substitutes assumption and its relation to equilibrium.
A:4 Gross Substitutes: For all price vectors p and p0 2 RK
+ such that
p0  p, if demand Qi() is single-valued both at p and at p0, xi 2 Qi(p), and
x0
i 2 Qi(p0), then x0k
i  xk
i for each k 2 K such that p0k = pk.
In Ausubel's auction, Ausubel (2006), bidders' values for bundles are
assumed to be integer. The t^ atonnement algorithm in Ausubel (2006) is
designed to use this property of utility functions to move on the grid of
integer price vectors, and to reach an integer-valued Walrasian equilibrium
6price vector. If the integer assumption on values is relaxed, more information
on bidders' values is needed to reach a Walrasian equilibrium price vector.
There is no straightforward way of modifying the t^ atonnement algorithm so
that it will reach a Walrasian equilibrium. If bidders' values for bundles are
not integer, then there may not exist an integer-valued Walrasian equilibrium
price vector, and the price adjustment procedure may not yield an ecient
allocation when it ends. As Lemma 1 below shows, relaxing the integer-values
restriction enriches the class of preferences of bidders.
A preference relation R dened on X  R is representable if there exists
a utility function u : X  R ! R such that for each x;y 2 X  R,
xRy if and only if u(x)  u(y):
A preference relation R is said to be in RD if and only if there exists
a quasilinear utility function u : X  R ! R representing R such that
u(;t) = U() + t where U : X ! D.
Lemma 1 shows that sets RZ, and RR are dierent.
Lemma 1. RZ ( RR.
Proof. RZ  RR is trivial. I will show that there exists R 2 RR such that





By the denition of RR, there exists u(;t) = U()+t representing R, where
U : X ! R. Equation 1 implies that
u(x;t) = u(y;0):
Therefore,
t = U(y)   U(x) 2 R n Z: (2)
Now, assume on the contrary that, there exists e u(;t) = e U()+t representing
R such that
e U : X ! Z: (3)
Equation 1 implies that e u(x;t) = e u(y;0). So, t = e U(y)   e U(x). Equation 2
implies that t = e U(y)  e U(x) 2 R n Z, a contradiction to equation 3. Hence,
RZ ( RR.
73 The Extension of Ausubel's Auction
In the extension of Ausubel's auction for discrete heterogeneous goods, there
are N bidders and an auctioneer with supply S 2 ZK
++ of goods to sell. The
auction designed is a continuous-time dynamic game. The time is repre-
sented by a lexicographically ordered pair (t;r) consisting of a continuously
increasing clock t 2 [0;1), and an increasing integer counter r 2 Z+.
The auction starts at clock time t = 0, an initial price vector p(0) 2
RK
+, and the counter is initialized to r = 0. The auctioneer adjusts prices
continuously according to the extended t^ atonnement algorithm. When the
extended ascending algorithm starts at p(0), each bidder reports his demand
set at p(0). After this rst round of reports, if there are bidders who would
like to report new demand sets at the same price vector p(0), the auctioneer
increases the counter r by 1 in each round with each new demand set reports
from bidders. After the reports are over at prices p(0) (there are nitely
many rounds by the no cyclic reports any round assumption stated below),
the auctioneer determines the set of goods in excess demand E+(p(0)) using
the demand reports from the last round at clock time t = 0. These reports
are denoted by xi(p(0))  Xi for each bidder i 2 N. The counter is reset
to r = 0, and the prices of these goods in excess demand are increased at
the same rate continuously whereas prices of the rest of the goods remain
the same. As prices are being adjusted, bidders may add bundles to their
demand set or they may remove bundles from their demand set. Each bidder
is required to report his demand set at all price vectors at which he adds a
bundle to his demand set.
Steps of the Procedure. Clock time t 2 [0;1) of the price adjustment is
called a step of the procedure if there is a bidder who reports his demand set
at p(t).
If a bidder reports his demand set at time t, then the auctioneer stops the
price adjustment and the clock at time t. Then, the counter r is increased,
and other bidders are allowed to respond to that bidder's report at the same
clock time. This time structure allows bidders to respond to each other's
reports at the soonest instant in continuous time (see Ausubel (2004), p.1465,
and Simon and Stinchcombe (1989)). I suppress the counter r from the
notation of prices p(t) without any confusion because prices will stay the
same through out the rounds at the same clock time t. The auctioneer
increases the counter r by 1 in each round with each new demand set report
from bidders. Then, the auctioneer computes the set of goods in excess
8demand E+(p(t)) using the demand reports from the last round at clock
time t, which are denoted by xi(p(t))  Xi for each bidder i 2 N. Next,
the auctioneer resumes the price adjustment by increasing prices of all goods
in E+(p(t)) at the same rate continuously, and holds the prices of the rest
of the goods the same. The extended ascending algorithm terminates when
the set of goods in excess demand is an empty set. The extended descending
algorithm works analogously.
Each bidder observes history h representing the prior play of the game
consisting of a nite string of vectors of clock time t, price vector p(t) at time
t, and a prole of demand sets reported at (t;r). In order to simplify the
notation, I suppress the round r from the notation without any confusion.
The round of the game at clock time t is represented by the order of these
vectors. For example, if h = (0;p(0);x);(0;p(0);x0), then x is the round
r = 0 demand reports at clock time t = 0, and x0 is the round r = 1 demand
reports at clock time t = 0. Note that if bidders truthfully report their
demand sets, then at each step there will be a single round. The strategy
i(h)  Xi is a set-valued function of history. The strategy space of i consists
of all such functions with the following restriction:
No Cyclic Reports in Any Round. At each t 2 [0;1), no bidder is allowed
to report a demand set twice at any rounds r and r0 such that r < r0 if he
reports a dierent demand set at round r00 such that r < r00 < r0.
This restriction does not prevent bidders from bidding sincerely. Since
there are nitely many possible demand sets for each bidder, this restriction
on strategies also guarantees that the consecutive reporting of bidders at each
clock time t lasts nitely many rounds, and the clock resumes its increase at
the time where it stopped.
Following Ausubel (2004) and Ausubel (2006), ex post perfect equilibrium
is used in the dynamic game dened above:
The strategy prole figi2N constitutes an ex post perfect equilibrium if
for every history h, and for every realization of private information fuigi2N,
the prole of continuation strategies fi(jh;ui)gi2N constitutes a Nash equi-
librium of the game in which the realization of fuigi2N is common knowledge.
The notion of \crediting and debiting," which is introduced in Ausubel's
auction and used in the extension proposed here, works as follows: During the
price adjustment, if opponents of bidder j lower the quantity they demand
of a good in their bids, then it is credited to bidder i at price p(t). On
the other hand, if opponents of bidder j rise the quantity they demand of
a good, then it is debited from bidder j at price p(t). The auction ends,
9say at time T 2 [0;1), whenever there is a market clearing allocation in
bidders' demand sets at p(T). For each bidder credits and debits are added,
monetary transfers are made, and goods are allocated. For an illustration of
Ausubel's auction, see the example in Ausubel (2006), pp. 606-607.
For each bidder i 2 N, his payment is dened as
ai(T) = p(0)  [S   x i(0)]  
Z T
0
p(t)  dx i(t) (4)





For a detailed discussion of this payment function see Ausubel (2006). In
Section 4.3, I show that this payment function is well-dened, and path
independent.
4 The Extended Ascending and Descending
Algorithms
4.1 Determining the Price Path
In the extended ascending algorithm and the extended descending algorithm,
at each price p, given the demand reports of bidders, the set of goods in excess
demand is found using the function




where L : RK
+ ! R is a Lyapunov function. Note that this function, by en-
velope theorem, is minimized at Walrasian equilibrium prices. The following
Lemma from Ausubel (2005) shows important properties of the Lyapunov
function L() of equation 5.
A function L : RK
+ ! R is submodular if for each p;p0 2 RK
+
L(p ^ p
0) + L(p _ p
0)  L(p) + L(p
0):
Lemma 2 (Ausubel (2005)). Under the gross substitutes assumption A4, the
Lyapunov function L() of equation 5 is a submodular and convex function.
10Proposition 1 below is from Ausubel (2005) and is valid without any
change when bidders' values for bundles are real rather than integer. Propo-
sition 1 shows the relationship between the Walrasian equilibrium, the Lya-
punov function, and the social surplus.
Proposition 1 (Ausubel (2005)). Suppose that Assumptions A1   A3 hold,
and that a Walrasian equilibrium exists. Then, the set of Walrasian equilib-
rium price vectors equals the set of minimizers of L(), and the set of Wal-











Corollary. Suppose that Assumptions A1   A4 hold. Then, the set of Wal-
rasian equilibrium price vectors is a nonempty lattice and there exist the low-
est and the highest Walrasian equilibrium price vectors, p 2 RK
+ and p 2 RK
+,
respectively.
The Corollary to Proposition 1 is also from Ausubel (2005), but integer
properties of the highest and the lowest Walrasian price vectors are dropped
as they are not necessarily true when bidders' values for bundles are not
restricted to integers. For the proof of the Corollary to Proposition 1, see
Ausubel (2005).
The Corollary to Proposition 1 implies that for any economy (fui()gi2N;S),
there exist Walrasian equilibrium price vectors p 2 RK
+ and p 2 RK
+ such
that if p 2 RK
+ is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector, then p  p  p.
The next lemma shows that as a set of prices are increased (decreased) in
the extended ascending (descending) algorithm, if a bidder removes a bundle
from his demand set, he does so immediately, i.e. as soon as prices start to
increase.
Lemma 3. Suppose that Assumptions A1 A2 hold. Let i 2 N, xi;x0
i 2 Xi,
and p 2 RK
+ be such that Ui(xi)   p  xi = Ui(x0
i)   p  x0
i.
11If there exist  2 RK
+ and 0 > 0 such that
Ui(xi)   (p  
0)  xi > Ui(x
0




then for each  > 0
Ui(xi)   (p  )  xi > Ui(x
0
i)   (p  )  x
0
i;
and if there exist  2 RK
+,  6= 0 and 0 > 0 such that
Ui(xi)   (p  
0)  xi = Ui(x
0




then for each  > 0
Ui(xi)   (p  )  xi = Ui(x
0
i)   (p  )  x
0
i:
Proof. Suppose that p 2 RK
+, and xi;x0
i 2 Xi such that
Ui(xi)   p  xi = Ui(x
0
i)   p  x
0
i: (6)
Then, by equation 6, for each   0 and for each  > 0,
Ui(xi)   (p  )  xi > Ui(x
0
i)   (p  )  x
0
i
if and only if
0 >   (xi   x
0
i): (7)
Observe that inequality 7 holds for some 00 > 0 if and only if it holds for all
 > 0.
If there exist  2 RK
+,  6= 0 and 0 > 0 such that
Ui(xi)   (p  
0)  xi = Ui(x
0




then by equation 6,

0  (xi   x
0
i) = 0:
Thus, for each  > 0,
  (xi   x
0
i) = 0:
Hence, the result follows.
12Suppose that a bidder strictly prefers one bundle to another. If prices are
increased (decreased) linearly, then there are two possibilities: either he will
keep preferring one to the other, or he will be indierent between them at a
unique price and he will reverse his preferences over these bundles as prices
continue to linearly increase (decrease). This is formally stated in the next
Lemma.
Lemma 4. Suppose that Assumptions A1 A2 hold. Let i 2 N, xi;x0
i 2 Xi,
p 2 RK
+, and  2 RK
+ be such that Ui(xi) (p)xi > Ui(x0
i) (p)x0
i.
Then, one of the following holds:
1. There exists a unique x0
i > 0 such that
Ui(xi)   (p  x0
i)  xi = Ui(x
0




and for each  2 (0;x0
i)
Ui(xi)   (p  )  xi > Ui(x
0
i)   (p  )  x
0
i;
and for each  > x0
i
Ui(xi)   (p  )  xi < Ui(x
0
i)   (p  )  x
0
i:
2. For all  > 0, Ui(xi)   (p  )  xi > Ui(x0
i)   (p  )  x0
i.
Proof. If   (xi   x0
i) > 0 then Ui(xi)   (p  x0
i)  xi = Ui(x0









i) . If   (xi   x0
i)  0 then
Ui(xi)   (p  )  xi > Ui(x0
i)   (p  )  x0
i for all  > 0.
Suppose that a bidder i 2 N announces his demand set at Qi(p)  Xi
at price vector p 2 RK
+. I will now show how the auctioneer can determine
bundles that will stay in bidder i's demand set when prices of a subset of
goods are all slightly increased (or decreased).
For each p; 2 RK
+, a minimal-cost-increase bundle e xi(p;) 2 Qi(p) is
a bundle bidder i demands at p that has the lowest cost increase when prices
increase from p to p + , i.e.
e xi(p;) 2 argmin
x2Qi(p)
f  xg: (8)
13Analogously, a maximal-cost-decrease bundle e yi(p;) 2 Qi(p) is a bun-
dle bidder i demands at p that has the highest cost decrease when prices
decrease from p to p   , i.e.
e yi(p;) 2 argmax
x2Qi(p)












f(Ui(e xi(p;))   p  e xi(p;))   (Ui(y)   p  y)g:
If i(p) is nite, then i(p) is the dierence between the highest and the
second highest utility levels bidder i can achieve from bundles in Xi at price





Note that i(p) is innite if and only if bidder i is indierent among all
bundles at prices p.




Since there are nitely many bidders in N,
(p) > 0:
By the denition of (p), for each p 2 R++, for each i 2 N, for each x 2
Qi(p), and for each y 2 Xi n Qi(p)
(Ui(x)   p  x)   (Ui(y)   p  y) > (p):
Time t = 0 is the rst step of the extended algorithm. Observe that by
the denition of a step, time t 2 (0;1) is a step of the extended algorithm if
there exist i 2 N, xi 2 Qi(p(t)), and t0 2 [0;t) such that for each t00 2 (t0;t)
xi = 2 Qi(p(t
00)):
14Note that steps of the extended algorithm depend on the initial price and
preferences of bidders. If all bidders have integer valuations for all bundles,
the extended algorithm starts at an integer price vector, and bidders report
truthfully, then all steps will be at integer price vectors.
For each  2 R, let 
K = (k)k2K denote a K-dimensional vector such
that k =  for all k 2 K. Proposition 2 shows that the auctioneer can
compute each bidder's demand set for all prices in the K-dimensional (p)-
wide cube above (below) price vector p using that bidder's demand set at
p.
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumptions A1   A2 hold. For each i 2 N,
for each p 2 RK
+, for each  2 RK
+, and for each  2 R++ such that
0    (p)K, and 0    (p)K
Qi(p + ) = fe xi(p;) 2 Qi(p)g;
and
Qi(p   ) = fe yi(p;) 2 Qi(p)g:
Proof. Let i 2 N, p 2 RK
+, and  2 RK
+ such that 0    (p)K. Let
y 2 Xi.
Claim. If y = 2 fe xi(p;) 2 Qi(p)g, then for each  2 R++ such that 0 
  (p)K
Ui(e xi(p;))   (p + )  e xi(p;) > Ui(y)   (p + )  y: (11)
Proof of the Claim. There are two cases to consider:
Case 1. If y 2 Qi(p) n fe xi(p;) 2 Qi(p)g, then for each  2 R++ such
that 0    (p)K
Ui(e xi(p;))   (p + )  e xi(p;) > Ui(y)   (p + )  y:
Case 2. If y = 2 Qi(p), then
Ui(e xi(p;))   p  e xi(p;) > Ui(y)   p  y
.
Let  2 R++ such that 0    (p)K. Observe that as   0, and
e xi(p;);y 2 Xi

















If there does not exist y > 0 such that
Ui(e xi(p;))   (p + y)  e xi(p;) = Ui(y)   (p + y)  y;
then by Lemma 4
Ui(e xi(p;))   (p + )  e xi(p;) > Ui(y)   (p + )  y: (13)
If there exists such y > 0, then, as (Ui(e xi(p;)) p e xi(p;)) (Ui(y) 
p  y) = (e xi(p;)   y)  y, and by the denition of (p), for each k 2 K

























i < y  (e xi(p;)   y): (14)
Inequalities 12 and 14 imply that
  (e xi(p;)   y) < y  (e xi(p;)   y):
So, by the denition of y
(e xi(p;) y) <









Ui(e xi(p;))   (p + )  e xi(p;) > Ui(y)   (p + )  y: (16)
This completes the proof of the Claim.
16By the denition of e xi(p;), for all minimal-cost-increase bundles e xi(p;)
and e x0





i(p;) = Ui(e xi(p;)) (p+)e xi(p;): (17)
Equations 11, 13, 17 and 16 imply that
Qi(p + ) = fe xi(p;) 2 Qi(p)g:
Analogously it can be shown that
Qi(p   ) = fe yi(p;) 2 Qi(p)g:
For each  2 R, and for each subset of goods E  K, let 
E = (k)k2K
denote a K-dimensional vector such that k = 0 if k = 2 E, and k =  if
k 2 E.
As prices change, bidders' demand sets change: a bidder may remove a
bundle from his demand set, or add a bundle to his demand set. Lemma 5
shows a relationship between bundles in the demand set and those added
during the price adjustment.
Lemma 5. Suppose that Assumptions A1 A4 hold. Let i 2 N, p;p0 2 RK
+
such that p  p0,
Qi(p
0) n Qi(p) 6= ;;
and
Qi(p












i) = 1 and #(x
0
i n xi)  1:










On the other hand, if there exists k0 2 K such that x0k0
i = xk0
i + 1, then
p
0
k0   pk0 < p
0
k   pk:





0 = 2 E if there exists k





Proof. Dene  = p0 p. By Lemma 4, equation 18 implies that there does
not exist  2 (0;1) such that
Qi(p + ) n Qi(p) 6= ;;
i.e. as prices are increased linearly from p to p0, p0 is the rst price vector
reached at which a new bundle is added to the demand set.
Construction of x0
i. Let x0




i)   p  x
0
i  Ui(y)   p  y:
x0
i is a bundle bidder i adds to his demand set at p0 such that bidder i prefers
this bundle at p to all other bundles added at p0. Such x0
i exists because Xi
is nite.
Construction of xi. By Lemma 4, for each y 2 Qi(p0) n Qi(p), and for
each  2 [0;1]
Ui(x
0
i)   (p + )  x
0
i  Ui(y)   (p + )  y:
As Xi is nite, by Lemma 4, there exists 0 2 (0;1) such that for each
 2 (0;1), and y 2 Xi, if
Ui(y)   (p + )  y > Ui(x
0




y 2 Qi(p + ):
In words, there exists a price p+0 such that at all prices reached between
p + 0 and p0, there is no bundle both strictly preferred to x0
i and not in
18bidder i's demand set. Hence, by the single-improvement property (implied
by Assumptions the gross substitutes A4 and monotonicity A3, see Lemma
2 in Gul and Stacchetti (1999)), there exists




i)  1 and #(x
0
i n xi)  1:
Since the rst new bundle is added at p0 to bidder i's demand set as prices
are increased linearly from p to p0, by Proposition 2,
Qi(p + ) = Qi(p) \ Qi(p
0):
Therefore,





i)  1 and #(x
0
i n xi)  1: (19)
So, xi is a bundle in bidder i's demand sets at all prices reached between p
and p0 such that x0
i can be constructed by adding at most a unit of a good
and removing at most a unit of another good to xi.
As Ui(x0
i)   (p + )  x0
i = Ui(xi)   (p + )  xi,
 (Ui(x
0
i)   p  x
0
i) + (Ui(xi)   p  xi) = (xi   x
0
i)  :
Since xi 2 Qi(p) and x0
i = 2 Qi(p),
(xi   x
0
i)   > 0:
Therefore, by equations 19, there exists a unique k 2 K such that x0k
i = xk
i 1.
Observe that k = p0
k   pk > 0. Moreover, if there exists k0 2 K such that
x0k0
i = xk0
i + 1, then k   k0 > 0 implying p0
k0   pk0 < p0
k   pk. Otherwise,
k > 0 implying pk < p0
k. The rest of the proof follows trivially.
Lemma 6 explains the relationship between each bidder's demand set on
the corners of (p)-wide cube above (below) price vector p and his demand
sets on the edges of that cube.
19Lemma 6. Suppose that Assumptions A1   A4 hold. For each p 2 RK
+, for
each  2 [0;(p)], for each E  K, for each i 2 N, and for each   0 such
that for each k 2 E k = 0, and for each  2 R+ such that 0    
K
fe xi(p + 
E;) 2 Qi(p + 
E)g = Qi(p + 
E + ); (20)
and
fe yi(p   
E;) 2 Qi(p   
E)g = Qi(p   
E   ):
Proof. Consider the equation 20. Suppose on the contrary that there exist
p 2 RK
+,  2 [0;(p)], E  K, i 2 N,  2 R+,  2 RK
+ and e xi(p + 
E;)
such that 0    
K, and for each k 2 E k = 0, and equation 20 does
not hold. Then, either there exists e xi(p + 
E;) 2 Qi(p + 
E) such that
e xi(p + 
E;) = 2 Qi(p + 
E + ); (21)
or there exists
xi 2 Qi(p + 
E + ) n fe xi(p + 
E;) 2 Qi(p + 
E)g: (22)
Suppose that equation 21 holds. If  = 0 or  = 0, then equation 21
contradicts to the denition of e xi(;). So, suppose that  > 0 and   0.
By Lemma 3, equation 21 implies that
fe xi(p + 
E;) 2 Qi(p + 
E)g \ Qi(p + 
E + ) = ;;
which means that all minimal cost bundles are dropped from the demand set
at the same price vector which is between p + 
E and p + 
E + . Hence,
by Lemma 3 again,
Qi(p + 
E) \ Qi(p + 
E + ) = ;;




0 2 R++ : there exists x
0









= Ui(e xi(p + 
E;))   (p + 
E + 
0)  e xi(p + 
E;)g:
20Note that p + 
E +  is the rst price vector reached at which bidder i
adds a bundle to his demand set as prices increase linearly from p + 
E to
p + 
E + . Let xi 2 Xi be a bundle which bidder i adds to his demand
set at p + 
E +  such that xi is preferred at all prices between p + 
E
and p + 
E +  to all other bundles which bidder i adds to his demand
set at p + 
E + . Since Xi is nite, by Lemma 4 and equation 22,  is
well-dened, and  > 0. Observe that
 < ; (23)
and hence 0    
K. So, xi 2 Xi is such that
Ui(xi)   (p + 
E + )  xi =Ui(e xi(p + 
E;))
  (p + 
E + )  e xi(p + 
E;);
(24)
and for each 0 2 [0;], and for each xi 2 Qi(p + 
E + ) n Qi(p + 
E)
Ui(xi)   (p + 
E + 
0)  xi  Ui(xi)   (p + 
E + 
0)  xi:
Note that xi = 2 Qi(p + 
E), and by Lemma 5, there exists
e xi(p + 
E;) 2 Qi(p + 
E + )
such that
#(e xi(p + 
E;) n xi) = 1
and
#(xi n e xi(p + 
E;))  1:
By Proposition 2,
xi; e xi(p + 
E;) 2 Qi(p):
Hence,
Ui(xi)   p  xi = Ui(e xi(p + 
E;))   p  e xi(p + 
E;);
and by equation 24,
(e xi(p + 
E;)   xi)(
E + ) = 0:
Then, either

k = 0 for some k 2 K;
21a contradiction to Lemma 5 for prices p + 
E and p + 
E + , or

k    = 0 for some k 2 K;
a contradiction to equation 23 as   
K. An analogous argument can be
made for e yi(p   
E;).
The next proposition shows that for each price vector there exists a unique
set of goods which determine the direction in which prices increase (decrease)
in the extended algorithm.





such that for each p0 2 RK
+ if p  p0  p+(p), then L(p0) > L(p+(p)).
So, a minimal minimizer p+(p) is a minimizer of the Lyapunov function
of equation 5 in fp+ : 0    (p)Kg and this set does not contain any
price vector which is less than or equal to p+(p) in every coordinate, and a
minimizer of the Lyapunov function in that set.
Similarly, for each p 2 RK




such that for each p0 2 RK
+ if p  p0  p (p), then L(p0) > L(p (p)).
Proposition 3. Suppose that Assumptions A1   A4 hold, and that bidders
truthfully report their demand. Then, at each price p 2 RK
+, and at each  2
[0;(p)], there exist a unique minimal minimizer p+(p), a unique maximal
minimizer p (p), and sets of goods E+(p);E (p)  K such that
p+(p) = p + 
E+(p) (26)
and
p (p) = p   
E (p):
Corollary. Suppose that Assumptions A1 A4 hold, and that bidders truth-
fully report their demand. Then, for each step t of the extended ascending
(descending) algorithm, if the procedure does not terminate at t, then there
exists a step t0 > t such that there is no step ^ t such that ^ t 2 (t;t0).
22Proof of the Corollary. Let t 2 [0;1) be a step of the algorithm, and p(t)
be the corresponding price vector. If t is not the last step, then, by Propo-
sitions 2 and 3, there exist (p) > 0 and E  K such that no bidder adds
any bundle at any price reached between p(t) and p(~ t) = p(t) + 
E. Hence,
there is no step between t and ~ t. Let t0 = inf
t00>t and
t00 is a step
t00. Observe that t0 > ~ t,
and t0 is a step.
Proof. As L() is continuous and the set fp+ : 0    
Kg is compact,
L() attains a minimum. Thus, by Lemma 2, L() is a submodular function.
Hence, the set of minimizers of L() in fp+ : 0    
Kg are a nonempty
sublattice. Therefore, there exists a unique minimal minimizer p+(p) of L()
in fp +  : 0    
Kg:
Now, suppose on the contrary that there does not exist E+(p) satisfying
equation 26. Then, there exists k 2 K such that pk
+(p) = 2 fpk;pk + g: Let e p





+(p) = 2 fpk;pk + g
pk
+(p) if pk
+(p) 2 fpk;pk + g: (27)
Construct




maxfe k : k 2 Kg
:
Observe that as pk
+(p) = 2 fpk;pk + g, e   0, and hence,  is well-dened.
Moreover, p+(p) is a convex combination of e p + e  and e p: Note that e p +
e   
K. Hence, Lemma 6 for E  K such that e p = p + 
E, and for
 = e  implies that for each  2 [0;],
e xi(e p; e ) 2 Qi(e p + e ):
Therefore, for each  2 [0;] L(e p + e ) is linear in .
If L(e p+e )  L(e p), then L(e p)  L(p+(p)); a contradiction to p+(p) be-
ing the unique a minimal minimizer. On the other hand, if L(e p+e ) < L(e p),
then L(e p + e ) < L(p+(p)); a contradiction to p+(p) being a minimizer.
So, there exists E+(p) satisfying equation 26.
An analogous argument can be made for p (p) and E (p).
23The goods in E+(p) are called the goods in excess demand at price p.
This notion of excess demand is dierent from the classical notion of excess
demand. Gul and Stacchetti (2000) discuss the need for a dierent notion of
excess demand because of the problems arising during the price adjustment
when goods are discrete. Gul and Stacchetti (2000) point out to the distinc-
tion between the level of excess demand and the sum of quantities of goods
in excess demand in discrete goods. For example, two dierent goods can be
in excess demand but the level of excess demand may only be 1. The set of
goods in excess demand according to the classical notion and the one here
coincide if the demand correspondences are assumed to be single-valued. In
other words, the same set of goods will be in excess demand.
The following Lemma gives a simple method for determining the set of
goods in excess demand.
Lemma 7. Suppose that Assumptions A1 A4 hold, and that bidders truth-













and for each  2 [0;(p))
E+(p + 
E+(p)) = E+(p):
Moreover, if t and t0 are two consecutive steps of the extended ascending
algorithm such that t < t0, then for all ^ t 2 [t;t0)













and for each  2 [0;(p)),
E (p   
E (p)) = E (p):
Moreover, if t and t0 are two consecutive steps of the extended descending
algorithm such that t < t0, then for all ^ t 2 [t;t0)
E (p(^ t)) = E (p(t)):
24Proof. For each p 2 RK
+, by Proposition 3, there exist (p) 2 R++ and
E+(p)  K such that p+(p) = p + (p)E+(p). As
(p)





by Proposition 2 and by the denition of e xi(p;1E+(p)), for each i 2 N, and
for each  2 (0;(p)]
e xi(p;1










E+(p)))   (p + 
E+(p))  e xi(p;1
E+(p))))











E+(p)  e xi(p;1
E+(p)))
=L(p) + 




E+(p)  e xi(p;1
E+(p))):
So, minimizing L(p + 
E), and maximizing L(p)   L(p + 
E)) over the













Hence, for each ;0 2 (0;(p)], the set of solutions to equation 29 for 













and for each  2 (0;(p)]
E+(p + 
E+(p)) = E+(p):
25An analogous derivation can be made for E (p). Observe that at each




Note that Lemma 7 implies that in the extended ascending algorithm and
the extended descending algorithm, bidders reporting their demand sets at
the initial price vector and at prices at which they add a bundle to their
demand sets gives sucient information to the auctioneer to adjust prices
correctly.
4.2 Reaching Walrasian Equilibrium Prices in Finite
Steps
In this section, I will show that the extended algorithms terminate in any
economy as long as Assumptions A1   A4 are satised. Moreover, the ex-
tended ascending (descending) algorithm reaches a Walrasian equilibrium
price vector in nitely many steps if initial prices are suciently low (high).
Proposition 4 shows how the price vector at which the extended algorithm
terminates relates to the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors.
Proposition 4. Suppose that Assumptions A1   A4 hold, and that bid-
ders truthfully report their demand. Starting from any initial price vector
p(0) 2 RK
+, if the extended ascending algorithm ends at T, then p(T)  p.
Similarly, starting from any initial price p(0) 2 RK
+, if the extended descend-
ing algorithm ends at T, then p(T)  p.
Proof. Suppose, for the extended ascending algorithm, that p(T)  p. Then,
there exists a good k 2 K such that the price of good k at p(T) ^ p is less
than pk. Since p is the smallest Walrasian equilibrium price vector, p(T)^p
is not a Walrasian equilibrium price vector. Therefore, by Proposition 1
L(p) < L(p(T) ^ p): (30)
As L() is submodular by Lemma 2,
L(p(T) ^ p) + L(p(T) _ p)  L(p(T)) + L(p): (31)
26Inequalities 30 and 31 imply that
L(p(T) _ p) < L(p(T)):
By Propositions 2 and 3, and by the denition of () in equation 10, there
exist (p(T)) 2 R++ and E(p(T))  K such that p(T) + (p)E(p(T)) is the
unique minimal minimizer of L() in the cube fp+ : 0    (p(T))Kg.
Let p0 be a strict convex combination of p(T) and p(T) _ p such that 0 
p0   p(T)  (p(T))K. p0 exists as p(T) _ p  p(T). Convexity of L()
implies that L(p0) < L(p(T)). This means that E(p(T)) 6= ; and that p(T)
is not a minimizer in fp(T) +  : 0    (p(T))Kg. Therefore, the
extended ascending algorithm does not stop at T as it is possible to decrease
the Lyapunov function further, a contradiction. Hence, p(T)  p.
The result for the extended descending algorithm can be proven analo-
gously.
Proposition 5 shows that if the initial prices are smaller (larger) than
the lowest (highest) Walrasian equilibrium price vector, then all the price
vectors reached by the extended ascending (descending) algorithm are smaller
(larger) than the lowest (highest) Walrasian equilibrium price vector.
Proposition 5. Suppose that Assumptions A1   A4 hold, and that bidders
truthfully report their demand. In the extended ascending algorithm, starting
from any initial price vector p(0) 2 RK
+, if p(t)  p, then p(t0)  p for all
t0 > t. In the extended descending algorithm, starting from any initial price
vector p(0) 2 RK
+, if p(t)  p, then p(t0)  p for all t0 > t.
Proof. Consider the extended ascending algorithm. Suppose, on the contrary,
that there exist t and t0 such that t0 > t, p(t)  p, and p(t0)k > pk for some
k 2 K. As p() is continuous, there exists t00 such that t < t00 < t0 and




Since p() is continuous, and prices are ascending, t00 exists and p(t00)k = pk.
By Proposition 1, and as p is a Walrasian price vector, for each s > t00,
L(p)  L(p(s) _ p): (32)
Moreover, since L() is a submodular function by Lemma 2,
L(p(s) _ p) + L(p(s) ^ p)  L(p(s)) + L(p): (33)
27Inequalities 32 and 33 imply that
L(p(s) ^ p)  L(p(s)): (34)








By Proposition 3, there exists E  K such that
p(s) = p(t00) + (p(t00))
E:
for some s 2 (t00;t0). Since inequality 35 holds for s = s,
p(s) ^ p = p(t00) + (p(t00))
A
for some A ( E. Therefore, by inequality 34, p(s) is not a minimal mini-
mizer, a contradiction.
The result for the extended descending algorithm can be proven analo-
gously.
The next step (Theorem 1) is to show that the extended ascending algo-
rithm and the extended descending algorithm stop after nitely many steps.
Theorem 1. Suppose that Assumptions A1 A4 hold, and that bidders truth-
fully report their demands. Then, the extended ascending algorithm and the
extended descending algorithm terminate in nite steps.
Proof. The algorithm converges to a price vector. Consider the extended
ascending algorithm. As there are nite number of bidders and the con-
sumption set of each bidder is bounded, there is an upper bound on bidders'
values for each good. In other words, for each good k 2 K, there is a price
pk
max 2 R+ at and above which no bidder wants good k regardless of the
prices of the rest of the goods . Observe that, by Lemma 7, if the total quan-
tity demanded of a good k 2 K at price vector p(t) 2 RK
+ is less than the
total quantity of good k available, then the price of good k will not be in the
set of prices that will be increased at t in the extended ascending algorithm.






28By the Corollary to Proposition 3, for each step t0, there exists a step
t > t0 such that there is no other step ~ t such that t0 < ~ t < t, and there exists
a rational number tq 2 Q such that t0 < tq < t. Therefore, there are at most
countably many steps in the extended ascending algorithm. Let fpsgs2 be
the sequence of all price vectors reached by the extended ascending algorithm
at all steps.
Observe that, by construction of the extended ascending algorithm, if
t0 > t00, then p(t0)  p(t00). Therefore, for each s 2 ,
ps  ps+1:
As the sequence fpsgs2 is bounded above and monotonically increasing,
it converges to a price vector p 2 R+ such that p  (pk
max)k2K.
The relationship between the demand sets at price vectors of consecutive
steps. Note that for each s 2 , ps+1 is the rst price vector where a
bidder adds a bundle to his demand set after ps in the extended ascending
algorithm. Since the set of prices that are increased does not change between
consecutive steps in the extended ascending algorithm, the same set of prices
are increased from ps to ps+1. Therefore, there exist s > 0 and Es  K
such that
ps+1 = ps + s
Es;
which can be rewritten as




where s0 > 0 and Es0  K for each s0 2 Z such that 0  s0  s.
For each step s 2 , and for each bidder is 2 N who adds a bundle to his
demand set at price vector ps+1, by Lemma 5 for price vectors ps and ps+1,
there exist bundles
xis 2 Qi(ps) and x
0




is)  1 and #(x
0
is n xis)  1; (37)





is + 1; (38)






The strict monotonicity of excess demand. For each s 2 , let ts 2 [0;1)
be such that
ps = p(ts):
Now I will show that the total quantity of goods in excess demand strictly





















As the prices in Es are increased from ps to ps+1, by Lemma 3, for each
i 2 N and for all t;t0 2 (ts;ts+1)
Qi(p(t)) = Qi(p(t
0));
and for each t 2 [ts;ts+1)
Qi(ps)  Qi(p(t))
and by the denition of step,
Qi(p(t))  Qi(ps+1): (40)
Therefore, for each t 2 (ts;ts+1)
Qi(p(t))  Qi(ps) \ Qi(ps+1);
and by Lemma 3
Qi(p(t)) = Qi(ps) \ Qi(ps+1):
For each i 2 N and for each t 2 (ts;ts+1), by equation 40, and by the



































































































Now I will show that the inequality 42 is strict.
Claim. There exists a bidder i0




s(ps+1) satisfying equation 8 at (ps+1;1E
s+1).
Proof of the Claim. Suppose, on the contrary, that this is not true. Then,







































by inequality 42, Es = Es+1. But equation 38 implies that for each bidder is
































is and xis are bundles satisfying equations 36 and inequalities 37.
However, Es = Es+1 and inequality 43 imply that ~ xis 2 Qis(ps)\Qis(ps+1)
does not satisfy equation 8 at (ps+1;1E
s+1), a contradiction.
Therefore, there exists a bidder i0




s(ps+1) satisfying equation 8 at (ps+1;1E
s+1). So, bidder i0
s



















for all ~ xi0
s 2 Qi0(ps) \ Qi0(ps+1).
Inequality 44 implies that inequality 41 is strict for i0
s. So, inequality 42
is strict.
The algorithm has nitely many steps. As the left side of inequality 39 is
integer and since the extended ascending algorithm terminates whenever it
is positive, there are nitely many steps.
Observe that the denition of step implies that if there is no market clear-
ing allocation at a step, then there will not be a market clearing allocation
until the next step. Therefore, the extended ascending algorithm terminates
at price vector pjj 1 = p(T) = p 2 RK
+ for some nite T.
The proof for the extended descending algorithm can be done analogously.
Theorem 2 (Theorem 3) shows that if the initial prices are suciently
low (high), then the extended ascending (descending) algorithm reaches the
lowest (highest) Walrasian equilibrium price vector of the economy in nitely
many steps.
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumptions A1 A4 hold, and that bidders truth-
fully report their demands. Then, starting from any initial price vector of
p(0) 2 RK
+ such that p(0)  p, the extended ascending algorithm reaches the
lowest Walrasian equilibrium price vector p in nite steps.
32Proof. The auctioneer asks each bidder i 2 N his demand set xi(p(0)) 
Xi at p(0). Using these demand sets, the auctioneer determines the set
E+(p(0))  K of goods in excess demand at p(0) (see Lemma 7). Prices of
these goods in E+(p(0)) are increased continuously at the same rate while
the rest remains the same. As prices are increased, at any time t 2 [0;1),
if there is a bidder who adds a bundle to his demand set, then the price
adjustment stops. Each bidder i reports his demand xi(p(t))  Xi at p(t).
The auctioneer determines the set E+(p(t))  K of goods in excess demand
at p(t) (see Lemma 7). Prices of goods in E+(p(t)) are increased continuously
at the same rate while the rest remains the same. The extended ascending
algorithm reaches some price vector in nite steps (see Theorem 1). By
Propositions 4 and 5, the price vector the extended ascending algorithm
reaches is p, and by Proposition 1, there exists a market clearing allocation
(x
i)i2N such that x
i 2 xi(p) for each i 2 N, provided that bidders report
their demands truthfully.
The proof of the convergence of the extended descending algorithm to the
highest Walrasian equilibrium price, Theorem 3 below, is analogous to the
proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. Suppose that Assumptions A1 A4 hold, and that bidders truth-
fully report their demands. Then, starting from any initial price vector of
p(0) 2 RK
+ such that p(0)  p, the extended descending algorithm reaches
the highest Walrasian equilibrium price vector p in nite steps.
A price vector p0 2 RK
+ is a supporting price vector if there exists an
allocation x0 = (x0
i)i2N such that
P
i2N xi  S, and for each i 2 N, x0
i 2
Qi(p0).
Theorem 2 imposes restrictions on the initial price vector. Theorem 4
shows that if these conditions are violated, then the extended ascending
algorithm reaches in nite steps a supporting price vector whenever bidders
report their demand sets truthfully.
Theorem 4. Suppose that Assumptions A1 A4 hold, and that bidders truth-
fully report their demand. Let p(T) be a price vector the extended ascending
algorithm reaches at T 2 [0;1). Then, the extended ascending algorithm
ends at p(T) in nite steps if and only if p(T) is a supporting price vector.
Proof. Dene a new economy by adding a ctitious bidder 0 with the con-
sumption set X0 = fx0 2 ZK : 0  x0  Sg, and utility function U0(x0) =
33p(T)  x0 to the economy. So, the indirect utility function of bidder 0 is
V0(p) = ((p(T)   p) _ 0)  S. Observe that p(T) is a Walrasian equilibrium
price of the economy with bidder 0 if and only if p(T) is a supporting price
vector of the economy without bidder 0. The Lyapunov function for the
economy with bidder 0 is e L(p) = p  S +
Pn
i=0 Vi(p), and








Since Vi(p)  Vi(p(T)_p) for any i 2 N [f0g, e L(p)  e L(p(T)_p) for any
p 2 RK
++. Now suppose that the price adjustment procedure in the economy
with bidder 0 terminates at p(T). Then, p(T) minimizes e L(). Suppose on
the contrary that there exists p 2 RK
++, p 6= p(T), such that e L(p) < e L(p(T)).
Observe that e L(p _ p(T)) < e L(p(T)). So, for any (p) 2 R;(p) > 0, there
exists p0 2 fp(T) +  : 0    (p)Kg such that p0 is a strict convex
combination of p_p(T) and p(T). As, by Lemma 2, e L() is a convex function,
e L(p0) < e L(p(T)). This contradicts to the assumption that the algorithm
terminated at p(T).
Since p(T) is a minimizer of e L(), applying Proposition 1 to e L(), p(T) is
a Walrasian equilibrium price of the economy with bidder 0. Therefore p(T)
is a supporting price of the economy without bidder 0. By Theorem 1, the
price adjustment procedure converges in nite steps.
4.3 Truthful Bidding is an Ex Post Ecient Equilib-
rium
In the t^ atonnement algorithm of Ausubel (2006), prices are adjusted in
discrete time and they take integer values. Ausubel (2006) converts the
t^ atonnement algorithm to a continuous procedure by linearly increasing prices
between consecutive integer-valued price vectors, and uses the continuous-
time procedure to show that sincere bidding is an ecient equilibrium Ausubel's
auction, and the procedure yields Walrasian equilibrium prices. The ex-
tended t^ atonnement algorithm is also a continuous-time procedure. Observe
that the extended t^ atonnement algorithm and the continuous version of the
34t^ atonnement algorithm follow the same path if bidders' values for bundles are
integer, the initial price vector is integer-valued, and the extended ascending
algorithm has a unit rate of change.





cE(p(t)) if k 2 E(p(t))
0 if k = 2 E(p(t))
for all t except when t is a step, and
E(p(t)) = E+(p(t)) and cE+(p(t)) > 0
for the extended ascending algorithm, and
E(p(t)) = E (p(t)) and cE (p(t)) < 0
for the extended descending algorithm.
By Lemma 1 in Ausubel (2006), if p() is continuous and for each j 2
N;j 6= i, any k 2 K xk
j(), amount of good k demanded by bidder j, is
of bounded variation, then ai(T) is well-dened. Moreover, if p() is also a
piecewise smooth function from [0;T] to RK, and for each j 2 N;j 6= i, Uj()
is a concave and continuous function, then by Lemma 2 in Ausubel (2006)
ai(T) = p(0)  [S   x i(0)]  
X
j6=i;j2N
[Uj(xj(p(T)))   Uj(xj(p(0)))]: (45)
Observe that the price path induced by the extended ascending (descend-
ing) algorithm is piecewise linear and continuous. Therefore, since substitutes
preferences imply concave utility functions (see Ausubel (2006), p.617), the
conditions of Lemmas 1 and 2 in Ausubel (2006) hold. So, by Lemmas 1 and
2 in Ausubel (2006), payment function given in equation 4 is well-dened and
path-independent, and the equality 45 holds for the extended t^ atonnement
algorithms. Hence, Theorems 10 and 20 in Ausubel (2006) hold literally (see
the discussion on p.620 Ausubel (2006)) for the extension of the Ausubel
auction proposed in this paper. As a result, starting at a suciently low
(high) price vector, the truthful bidding constitutes an ecient equilibrium
in the extension of Ausubel's auction, and the extended ascending (descend-
ing) algorithm terminates at a Walrasian equilibrium price vector in nitely
many steps.
355 Conclusion
In this paper, I extended the ascending and the descending price adjust-
ment procedures proposed in Ausubel (2006) to real-valued quasilinear util-
ity functions. I show that these extended procedures converge to a Walrasian
equilibrium price vector in nite steps. Unlike the t^ atonnement algorithm in
Ausubel (2006), the extended t^ atonnement algorithm does not require any
information on bidders' when bidders' values for bundles real.
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